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*Liberal Consensus or Ideological
Battleground: Some Reflections
on the Hartz Thesis*

In the last few years it has become clear that Canadian historiography has entered a new phase, and that most Canadian historians are interested in questions which concern narrower horizons than those which attracted their predecessors. The point is an obvious one; the awakening or revival of interest in such areas as urban and labour history, land holding and land use patterns, family history and collective biography, demography, or the study of particular groups has been remarkable. Regional history has become a major preoccupation, accompanied by the appearance of excellent journals. Canadian historians, moreover, have begun to group themselves with varying degrees of formality into regional or area study associations.

It is easy enough to trace the origins and development of this movement in the historiography. For a considerable time it has been evident that the interpretative sweep of the Laurentian thesis, a brilliant explanation of the nation-building process, has been found less satisfactory as an account of other aspects of our life. As long ago as 1946, W.L. Morton launched a series of important critiques of the thesis, drawing attention to its centralist and nationalist bias. Since then, others have challenged its division of the Canadian population into winners and losers, heroes and villains, depending upon where they stood with respect to the national dream. Thus J.M.S. Careless, observing that "the nation-building approach to Canadian history neglects and obscures even while it explains and illuminates," suggested an approach in terms of the "limited identities of region, culture and class." Alan Smith subsequently traced the historical content of the idea of the mosaic, and concluded that "the national preoccupation came to be . . . with creating a nation out of culturally disparate groups, not with establishing cultural uniformity".¹

Perhaps the deep divisions laid bare by the politics of the last decade or more have induced historians to seek explanations through more restricted

and specialized studies. Perhaps English-speaking historians have become somewhat envious of the distinctiveness and coherence, if not the concord, that marks the historiography of French Canada, and are searching for a comparable uniqueness in the complexities of the rest of the country, if only to demonstrate that English Canada, too, has both a special past and destiny. Historians are no more immune than other groups to the resonances of their times. Quite apart from these considerations, however, it is perfectly clear that much has been overlooked of our past, and that the content of Canadian history positively invites more specialized approaches.

It will be some years before a new synthesis emerges; before historians can speak with more confidence both to each other and to a larger public. When such a synthesis forms, it will inevitably be a richer and more complex explanation of the life of the Canadian people than we now have. The Laurentian thesis is not a sufficient explanation; too much is left out of account. The idea of limited identities is a perception, not a thesis; it identifies an historical reality, but offers no illuminating hypothesis for it. Among other explanations of the manner in which our society has developed, by far the most interesting and stimulating is the Hartzian fragment thesis. Even though it, too, is an oversimplification, it is filled with provocative insights and has the decided merit of positively inviting fruitful challenge from many angles.

The fragment thesis deals with the problem of limited identities by denying the importance of such variations in the society-building process. When this lunar perspective is applied to the history of the English-speaking colonies of British North America, significant detail recedes, angularities are softened and rounded, mountains are made low and rough places plain. Yet the more conscientiously the formula is applied, the more anomalies swim upwards into view. The view from space has a blurred symmetry, yet one that we who are earthbound scarcely recognize as our own landscape.

But if it is assumed that discordance and complexity are at least as significant as correspondence and similarity, then, in answer to the fragment thesis, a counter-hypothesis comes to mind. Ideological clash, a possibility specifically excluded by the Hartz analysis, can help to explain the persistence of limited identities and can offer a less deterministic explanation of the society-building process.

Every historian of the pre-Confederation period must take cognizance of Louis Hartz's *The Founding of New Societies*, for, as "a general theory of five societies created by European migration in modern times," it grapples with the very problems they are attacking. To Hartz, English Canada is a

liberal bourgeois fragment of the Old World, and therefore, despite certain "Tory touches", it has been "governed by the ultimate experience of the American liberal tradition." His approach has achieved a measure of influence. J.M.S. Careless, for example, accepted the hypothesis of the formative power of transferred cultural fragments, but contended that the traditions of English Canada were shaped, not by the weak remnants of the eighteenth century American empire, but by "the swamping force of earlier nineteenth century British immigration" and by "the organic, pragmatic Victorian liberalism" these immigrants brought with them.²

When distilled from the persuasive witchery of his language, his wealth of allusion, and his almost endless flow of insight and perception, Hartz's argument reduces to a few main points. All the societies considered by his collaborators and himself are fragments "struck off", "hurled outwards", "extricated" from Europe into new lands. According to differences in time and place of detachment, the fragments are feudal, liberal, or radical. Whatever its type, the fragment is transformed in a fashion that creates the cultural co-ordinates of the new society. That transformation is described as a "purely mechanistic" process, resting upon Hartz's quasi-Hegelian perception of the European historical process. His great ideologies—feudalism, bourgeois liberalism, radicalism and radical socialism—are the inexorable results of the clash of opposites. Since Europe "locks them together in a seething whole," none has the freedom to evolve according to its own inner logic.³

The dictates of the European historical process do not apply to the fragment. Freed from the strangling effect of the ideological jungle of the Old World, the fragment's development pursues a strange new course. "All sorts of magic inevitably takes place." The first piece of magic is the traditionalizing or conservatizing effect. The fragment freezes culturally; the United States, for example, has had "over three hundred years of liberal immobility." In the American case, the liberal fragment escaped not merely its enemy, the feudal and authoritarian past, but because of that very fact, it escaped the European future as well—"Marx fades because of the fading of Laud." So, with both past and future removed, and disturbing emanations from Europe cut off, the fragment, like a time capsule, is cocooned within its new environment.⁴

Out of the cocoon rapidly emerges a "rich interior development", faithful to the ideological nature of the fragment, but free to flourish in a manner impossible in the Old World. For the fragments are Cinderellas; "the story here is marvellous," Hartz declares; "Bossuet, Locke and Cobbett, miserable men abroad, all wake up to find worlds finer than they have known." What transpires is the swift emergence of fragment nationalism. The

ideology of the fragment becomes a universal, "sinking below the level of thought to the level of an assumption." Then, "almost instantly", it re-emerges as nationalism. "Feudalism comes back at us as the French-Canadian spirit, liberalism as the American way of life, radicalism as the Australian legend." Since the fragment, by definition, cannot contain its enemies, its nationalist ideology has a peculiarly conformist quality. Europe is rejected as decadent, sinful and alien. The immigrant become the object of utmost suspicion, either to be rebuffed, as by the French Canadians or the Afrikaners, or to be subjected to a conscious process of assimilation to the ideological norms of the new nation.⁵

Canada is unusual, though not unique, in that it is a two-fragment situation, containing competing ideologies of feudalism and liberalism. (It should be observed incidentally that Hartz has little or nothing to say about the possibility that this conjunction may have started the Hegelian engines humming once more.) Adopting A.R.M. Lower's primary antithesis, he states that "it is to be corporate and Catholic to be French in Canada; to be Protestant and liberal to be English". Since English Canada, by definition, could contain no genuine conservative element, its political tensions resolve themselves in struggles between Whigs, the elite wing of the liberal spectrum, and liberal democrats, the counterpart of the petit bourgeois Jacobins of Europe. Thus we are presented with the picture of that great Jacobin, George Brown, refusing to "knuckle under the Whigs of Kingston".⁶

We are told by Hartz that the fragment process is "as simple, as intelligible as any historical process we normally take for granted." Moreover, if one is disposed to reject the mechanistic determinism of the hypothesis, and to argue that English-speaking Canadians in the past did make choices about their future, even though the context in which such choices were made was not so variegated as that of the world left behind, then one becomes part of that "bottomless subjectivity" of the fragment that is its fate as the memory of Europe recedes. So much for Hartz.⁷

II

Now with all this there are serious difficulties. The first and most obvious is the identification of the fragment itself, that potent leaven. In American history, the liberal moment is precisely that when the first Puritans set foot on the soil of New England. What group or collectivity is the liberal culture bearer, the fundamental moulder of English Canada's cultural tradition, the Canadian Cinderella? It would be unfair to suggest that it was that group which first settled within the geographic bounds of English Canada—but the very presence, and survival, of the Acadians introduces a first

unsettling complexity. Though Hartz himself does not particularize, his followers seem to have settled upon the Loyalists as the founding group, and we might perhaps assist them by adding the pre-Loyalist Yankees of Nova Scotia and the thousands of American settlers who poured into Upper Canada in response to Simcoe's open door policy. Somewhat anomalously, these groups are all sub-fragments of a fragment. Passing for the moment over that complication, we must nevertheless ask ourselves whether the American components of the English Canadian fragment were liberal brethren to the Scottish Presbyterians of Nova Scotia and their Upper Canadian compatriots, to the *mélange* of foreign Protestants at Lunenburg, to the Ulstermen of the Moncton region or to the Yorkshiremen of Chignecto. If they were, then in what relationship did they stand to such groups as the Highland Catholics of Cape Breton, Prince Edward Island and the eastern counties of Upper Canada?

A second difficulty has to do with the timing of the liberal moment. Though Hartz tells us that the coming of democracy in English Canada was "delayed by a Tory touch, by imperial arrangements, or the presence of the French feudal fragment"—it is somehow characteristic of his argument that it does not really matter which—he nowhere reveals just when the liberal ideology became co-terminous with the fragment, just when homogenization occurred, just when that ideology, having been sublimated, was reborn as nationalism, and just when immigrants were consciously assimilated to it.⁸ The problem is, of course, that imperial arrangements, geography and communications divided colonial societies from each other in a manner far more isolating than the pre-Revolutionary American colonies. All of them had separate existences for appreciable lengths of time: Upper Canada and New Brunswick for three-quarters of a century, Prince Edward Island for about a hundred years, Nova Scotia for a century and a half, and Newfoundland for at least three hundred years. The Hartzian scholar may be forced either to defer the timing of the magical liberal moment, or to face the possibility that he is examining, not the founding of one but of several new societies in British Canada.

Part of the problem is the level of abstraction upon which Hartz is writing. It is not men, women and children who migrate, on crowded decks, or packed in holds and steerages, it is ideas and symbolic figures; it is not peoples who evolve, but ideological-cultural entities. One of the strengths of his argument is his emphasis upon the significance of the European heritage, but the very generality of his categories makes them difficult to apply to the awkward facts of Canadian history. The Acadians, perhaps, were feudal, but since they lacked most of the hierarchy implied by the category, the identification itself is useless. Were the Newfoundland Irish feudal, or liberal

with tribal touches? Does it help to identify the Chignecto Yorkshiremen as liberal, or is it more important to know that they were Methodist, or that in Yorkshire they had been small tenant farmers and landless labourers? The work of the *Annales* School in France, or that of the modern English social historians—or, for that matter, that of the historians of colonial America—shows that it matters very much indeed, in terms of cultural norms, whether an immigrant came from Nantes, Dieppe, or Marseilles, and whether a man had farmed in Devon, Yorkshire or Fife. At this level of analysis the fragment thesis is of no utility, for it overrides variation and assumes the very points we have yet to investigate. By the same token, Canadian historians can no longer be content with their own crude categories of Scots, Irish, English, French or even Loyalist and American: European and American scholarship is now making available the kind of evidence that will permit a more precise and therefore a more complex appreciation of the variety of the European cultural legacy.

III

A crucial part of the fragment thesis is the contention that, once freed from the inhibiting effect of the European context, the fragment flowered untrammelled, in a Platonic fashion, towards its Ideal Form. There is a major objection to this contention. British North America was never isolated from Europe; it was never free to develop fully according to its own inner impulsions. It was not simply the continuing fact of the imperial presence, an imposing force in itself in the relatively small and weak colonial societies. Even more important was the continuing transmission to British North America of the political and social ideas of the Old World. The vehicles, human and literary, official and unofficial, for the transmission of British ideas, beliefs and assumptions to the several colonies need not concern us here; it is, after all, the familiar metropolitan story.

Admittedly, the inflow of the metropolitan culture was not uniformly spread throughout each colonial society. Its centres of dissemination were urban, and the degree to which it touched and influenced the mentality of the bulk of the population through the intricate internal network of communication each colony possessed has yet to be sufficiently explored. But the impact of what may be called the official culture upon those actively participating in the political life of the colonies was substantial. It determined the roles, set the standards and established the norms of those whose business it was to conduct the colonial institutional apparatus, it affected the attitudes and behaviour of those who aspired to a place in the structure, and it defined the limits even for many of those who found themselves in positions of political opposition.

There is an important contrast here with American colonial history. The presence of the metropolis and the diffusion of ideas from it were never so powerful and pervasive in the American colonies as in British North America. In colonial America, political power had devolved in considerable measure to such institutions as the town meeting and the parish vestry. In British North America, until the reforms of the era immediately before Confederation, each colony was a mirror of the Blackstonian principle that sovereignty (the qualified colonial version of it) was located at the centre. There decisions were made; the administration of them was left to the bureaucracy and to a chosen few in the localities. In a situation of power and no power (except for the periodic flurry of assembly elections), the socializing effect of political participation was far weaker than in colonial America. The lack of local representative institutions, a relatively low participation rate in assembly elections despite a quasi-democratic franchise, and the fact that most of the time politics was the concern of the few, seems to have acted to preserve local variations and to stratify values.

There is another important point of contrast with the American colonial experience. In all the British North American colonies with the exception of Newfoundland, imperial authority coincided with the arrival of settlers. In colonial America the very legitimacy of existing governments was from time to time called into question; in British North America immigrants of all origins were confronted by a constitutional structure, laws, rules and principles that seemed beyond challenge. Whether the American colonies were "born" liberal, as in the Hartzian conception, or, as seems more likely, they arrived at that happy state by the slow permeation through the culture of the implications of the early covenants and compacts, local government institutions or Lockean ideas by way of his Radical Whig popularizers, it is beyond question that by the Revolutionary era the root idea had taken hold that what legitimized government was the consent of the governed.⁹ This idea, fundamental to the liberal ethos, got short shrift in British North America. A brief attempt to institute the town meeting and local proprietorial control in Nova Scotia was cut off at birth in the 1760s. The Maudslowe rebels, who mimicked Congress in composing their declaration of independence in 1776, were swiftly overawed by armed force, then inundated by New Brunswick's Loyalist influx.

This brings us to the knotty question of the ideological content of Loyalism. According to the fragment formula, since America was liberal by definition, Loyalists could not possibly be conservatives. The American fragment, containing no feudal element, could not produce conservatism, since (again by definition) conservatism was the by-blow of the onslaught of the European liberal bourgeoisie upon feudalism. Loyalism, therefore, was

simply the defeated wing of American liberalism; the Loyalists were nothing more than anti-American Americans, Old Whigs, in the current scholarly vocabulary.

K.D. McRae, Professor Hartz's Canadian collaborator, has added some glosses to this picture. He has suggested, for example, that the high proportion of the European-born among the Loyalists is of little consequence. "That these recent immigrants," he observes, "were willing to pioneer a second time under similar conditions indicates an acceptance of the liberal ethos." This conclusion strains the evidence to meet the exigencies of the thesis and ignores W.H. Nelson's depiction of Loyalism as "congeries of conservative minorities resisting Americanization."¹⁰ To be sure, McRae notes that the principle of selection involved in the Loyalist exodus "has served to differentiate the English Canadian tradition from the American in certain subtle, minor ways." It all depends on the perspective. Others examining the content of Loyalist beliefs may conclude that "subtle" and "minor" were "major" and "significant."

It is undeniable that within the Loyalist spectrum Lockean ideas existed, though much depends upon whether Joseph Galloway, say, is taken as representing Loyalist thought and not, for example, Thomas Hutchinson, Daniel Leonard, Jonathan Boucher, or Mather Byles. More important, perhaps, is the fact that among the Loyalists who came to British North America, a distinctively American attitude towards government and authority was common. In Nova Scotia, a Loyalist-led Assembly impeached judges in the 1780s; in New Brunswick, in the sharp division between elite and rank and file which occurred at the inception of the colony, the rhetoric of the popular cause contained strong American accents. In Upper Canada, an individual like David MacGregor Rogers plainly represents the liberal vein in Loyalist thought. Accused as early as 1796 as being connected with a "republican and enemy of government" by a brother Loyalist, Nicholas Hagerman, by 1808, from his seat in the Assembly, Rogers bitterly attacked the forming network of power and patronage in the colony. "Upon any vacancy do we not see persons running, writing and using every means in their power to influence some powerful person in Europe . . . An American can have but little chance, let his abilities be what they may . . . Can it be any wonder that they should not feel such a warm attachment to the Government or constitution of the Country? " Rogers specifically objected to the freedom from popular control permitted the local government through its independent source of revenue from customs. Privately he reflected that the American Revolution was "a natural consequence of their arriving at a state of Opulence and Popularity;" the unstated future of Upper Canada seems plain enough.¹²

Though the persistence of the liberal democratic element among Loyalists is a matter of record, it is equally certain that among the bulk of the Loyalists who inclined to the government side, the liberal strain was rapidly subordinated to the values of the official political culture. Those values were undeniably conservative even in Hartzian terms; the only justification for calling them Whig would be the identification of Edmund Burke as a Whig when he wrote *Reflections on the French Revolution*. A careful examination of the rhetoric of the Upper Canadian elite and its substantial followings discloses little that is Lockean; only among some of the moderate conservative assemblymen are there occasionally such shadings. The most frequently cited political philosopher, at least among the conservatives of Upper Canada, was neither Locke nor Burke, but Sir William Blackstone. Blackstone has customarily been considered a Whig, but in the context of resurgent aristocratic and anti-democratic thought, he was a conservative, as R.R. Palmer has pointed out. As selectively used by Upper Canadian conservatives, Blackstone provided an eloquent evocation of the glories of the British constitution, a justification for aristocracy, and a specific rejection upon legal and historical grounds of popular sovereignty, of the Lockean compact and of the right of revolution. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, it was not Blackstone and Burke alone but the whole floodtide of counter-revolutionary British conservatism that surged through the arteries of British North America and permeated the mentality of its ruling groups. Europe had returned to North America. The fragment was not a fragment, but the seat of clashing ideologies, a dialectical battleground.

It seems a curious anomaly to charge the Hartzian school with neglect of the European dimension of British North American values, yet that seems to be the case. The conservatism of the colonies was the product of a fusion of the values of British conservatism, Loyalist hostilities, and the survival ethos of the leadership of other groups within each colony, for of course the Loyalists were by no means the only or even the chief component of the oligarchies in most of these societies. Just how such an intermeshing of values occurred, and how it varied from colony to colony, must await further investigation. In Upper Canada, for demographic, historic and geographic reasons, conservatism was most intense, the line between it and North American liberalism most sharply drawn, and the struggle between the two most embittered.¹³

IV

An understanding of the fundamental beliefs of any era, and the intensity with which they were held, is unlikely to be reached when one reasons solely from a set of postulates about the nature of the world

historical process. It is necessary, still, to engage in the laborious analysis of the surviving written record of a period, to crack its linguistic code, as it were, in order to identify the values and beliefs actually held, and their relationship to each other. The employment, no matter how dazzlingly, of such evocative names as Locke and Cobbett—or Blackstone—or even of such broadly inclusive terms as liberalism and conservatism, is to short-circuit the task of the historian.

Even a limited acquaintance with the literary record of early nineteenth century British North America is sufficient to indicate that a condition of ideological clash, not liberal consensus, existed. But it is not enough to pursue ideas through the literary record; they must be related to the cultural and material environment within which they were held. The fate of the idea of aristocracy will illustrate the point. Its reception in liberal North America has been counted an absurdity, and it is true that its enunciation in European terms scarcely survived the 1790s, though W.W. Baldwin for one can be found in its praise at a much later date. The idea itself did not die but was modulated and transformed (though in no magical way) until by the 1820s it had been reformulated as a rationale for the leadership of the best however determined. This modulation had occurred in response to a complex set of variables which included both the shifting constellation of beliefs and the changing social and economic institutions of the society. The idea, and the operative strategy that was connected to it, has had a long life in Canada. John Porter's *Vertical Mosaic* needs to be given historical underpinnings. How fascinating it would be to trace the mentalities, the behaviour patterns, the institutional folkways that have enabled the descendants of supposedly superseded elites—Cartwrights, Symonses, Robinsons, Richardsons and many others—to find places of honour and status for themselves, generation unto generation.

It is the persistence of culturally diverse societies that raises the greatest difficulty about the applicability of the fragment hypothesis to British North America. Liberal values, especially egalitarianism and individualism, ought to have been solvents of distinctions, eating away at differences stemming from other lands, and converting peoples into the People. To explain why this did not occur remains a challenge to pre-Confederation scholarship, and returns us to the theme of limited identities. How did the many groups of the Atlantic Provinces and Upper Canada first establish separate identities? Were their numbers reinforced, and their identities thereby sustained, by accretions from further immigration or through natural increase? To what extent did economic and geographic factors contribute to the forming pattern of particularism? To what degree did various groups and collectivities conform to broader norms in provincial societies, and to what degree were their values

threatened by those of the dominant groups in society? How far, in each province, was a condition of stable pluralism achieved, and how was it brought about? Answers to questions such as these require a complex historical scholarship, drawing upon the whole range of methods available, and employing the materials of what was once scornfully thought of as parish pump history.

It would be rash to venture at this point any covering statement to encompass such questions. What might be suggested is that a hypothesis that argues for the dominance of a conservative outlook among the directing groups of British North America may offer a readier explanation for the fact of pluralism, and some approaches to the manner in which it was articulated, than does the hypothesis of the liberal fragment.

What seems to have happened as a result of the immigration experience was not the flowering of a fragment but the efflorescence of group myths. Some of them are sectarian—the powerful consciousness of being a people set apart—although there may well be ethnic and economic dimensions of this phenomenon. Some myths fasten upon the migration experience itself, like that of the Pictou Scots and the coming of the *Hector*. Some are myths of a Golden Age overlaid by tragedy, as with the Acadians and the Loyalists. All sustain separate identity, all are exclusive in character.

The alien question in Upper Canada in the 1820s centred around the issue of whether or not post-Loyalist Americans should be accorded full civil rights as British subjects. Underlying the issue was a conflict between an exclusive and an assimilative myth. Here is the voice of the Loyalist:

I am an old man, but I have not forgotten the scenes of my youth—the house wherein I was born—the garden where I play, and the fields where my hands first learned to labour. Well can I remember how I was driven from them, and from the spot where my father fell, fighting for his king against rebels. By whom was I robbed of my patrimony? Even by such as [Barnabas Bidwell] who now claims equal privileges with the best of us. . . . [He] now comes forward after a lapse of a few years, to enjoy one of your highest prerogatives, to amend and make your laws, to sit, cheek by jowl, with your honourable men. What are you about, ye sons of Loyalists? Will ye suffer these things? ¹⁴

Speaking for the Americans, John Rolph said of them:

Upon their arrival they received grants of land; for they did not emigrate here to settle as squatters in the woods—not to spend the flower of their youth in hunting muskrats and destroying wolves—not to waste their strength in clearing the forest without the honour of owning an acre of it that the mosquitoes might the less disturb the dignified repose of those who sent the invitation—not to linger in the wilderness without a title to

clear an acre, pluck a mushroom, or strip a slippery elm bark to prepare even a dish of Indian soup—by no means. They came at this Imperial invitation not to be degraded—they came from a free country, elated with the assurance that they would enjoy freedom here.¹⁵

Here history speaks against the homogenizing force of the common pioneering experience.

Colonial conservatism did not act to break down such myths. Rather, in a variety of ways, it tended to sustain them. Since conservatives were disposed to think in terms of collectivities, not of individuals, their tendency was to identify individuals with reference to the groups to which they belonged. Conservatism, at least in Upper Canada, was a coalition both of interests and of particularisms, whether religious, ethnic or both. It made no high assimilative demands beyond its insistence upon adherence to vital survival values—loyalty, order, stability—values that coincided with the interests and outlooks of many of the groups and collectivities that made up colonial society. The remarkable convergence of attitudes held towards the United States, its political system and its social tendencies by a wide variety of disparate groups in British North America is not accidental. It can be interpreted as an expression of the success of long-dominant conservatism in imposing its outlook; it is just as likely that to each group, in different ways and from different perspectives, American civilization was perceived as threatening. Though the language of hostility towards the United States had a high degree of uniformity, its subjective content or inner meaning might be quite different for each group. For the most part, conservatism dealt with leaders, not follower. Elitist politics, though assimilating group chieftains to the values of the directing elites, made less impression upon their adherents.

This is not to claim any special virtue for early conservatism. Many of its spokesmen would have preferred more uniform and organic societies, and some of its leaders were prepared, like John Strachan, to use drastic methods to build such societies.¹⁶ But it does suggest that the prevalence of conservative beliefs is a factor to be taken into account when explaining the phenomenon of limited identities. Professor Careless, in referring to the swamping effect of British immigration and of the liberalism it purportedly brought with it, proposes to stand the Hartz thesis on its head. The arrival of the fragment is delayed until the 1830s or 1840s; the fate of the already existing people of British North America was to be assimilated to it and its values. This seems too George Brown-centred a view. I would suggest that there *was* a continuity in the society-building process of British North America. Though the shape and content of the early societies was certainly modified by massive immigration, to an extent yet to be explored, later

comers took on some of the values and patterns of the long-established societies. In other words, perhaps George Brown did knuckle under to those Whigs of Kingston.

For the pattern of English Canadian complexity derives not only from local, regional, ethnic and other variations, but also from the continued workings of a liberal-conservative dialectic. How far were the two sides of the dialectic reinforced by importation from abroad? When did a synthesis of values occur, and what forms did it take? It is probably right to look for its beginnings in the generation immediately before Confederation, but we have scarcely begun to trace its nature. The English Canadian style and character is not to be understood in terms of the consensus of a triumphant liberalism, but, out of its contradictory heritage, in terms of muted conservatism and ambivalent liberalism, of contradiction, paradox and complexity.

NOTES

¹ W.L. Morton, "Clio in Canada: the interpretation of Canadian history", *University of Toronto Quarterly*, XV (3), April, 1946; J.M.S. Careless, "Limited identities in Canada", *Canadian Historical Review*, L (1), March, 1969, pp.2-3; Allan Smith, "Metaphor and nationality in North America", *ibid.*, LI (3), September.

² Louis Hartz, *The founding of new societies: studies in the history of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia*, (New York, 1964), vii, p.4, p.33; Careless, "Limited identities", p.4.

³ Hartz, *Founding of new societies*, p.3, p.6, p.24.

⁴ *IBID.*, pp.4-6.

⁵ *IBID.*, pp.4-5, pp.13-14.

⁶ *IBID.*, pp.15-16n, pp.35-6.

⁷ *IBID.*, p.9, pp.24-5.

⁸ *IBID.*, p.40.

⁹ On the quest for legitimacy in the American colonies, see Michael Kammen, *People of Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Origins of American Civilization*, (New York 1973), 31ff.

¹⁰ W.H. Nelson, *The American Tory*, (New York 1961); Hartz, *Founding of new societies*, p.236, pp.238-9.

¹¹ See especially Bernard Bailyn, *The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1974), and A.Y. Zimmer and A.H. Kelly, "Jonathan Boucher: Constitutional Conservative", *Journal of American History*, LVIII (4), March, 1972, pp.897-922.

¹² Public Archives of Ontario, D.M. Rogers Papers, D.M. Rogers to James Rogers, 29 July 1795; Memoranda on speeches and proceedings of the U.C. Assembly on the school bill, 5 March (1808).

¹³ S.F. Wise, "Conservatism and Political Development: The Canadian Case", *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LXIX (2), Spring, 1970, pp.226-43.

¹⁴ *Kingston Chronicle*, "Address to the freeholders of Lennox and Addington", 1 February 1822.

¹⁵ *Canadian Freeman*, 8 February 1827.

¹⁶ Periods of high immigration and rapid social change frequently evoked the latent conservative urge to impose uniformity. Thus in the 1850s Egerton Ryerson called on all groups to forget differences born of national origin and religion and to “unite in one noble feeling of *Canadianism*—regarding Canada as their country, their *Home*—the home and hope of their children, and its highest advancement their highest earthly interest and glory.” Yet even Ryerson had to repress such urges. *Dr. Ryerson's letters in reply to the attacks of foreign ecclesiastics against the schools and municipalities of Upper Canada*, (Toronto, 1857), p.100.